From Moon to Budgets: India’s Lunar Exploration Triumphs, Sri Lanka’s Missed Opportunities

By Y P Prakash

Over the course of several years, the investment in India’s space exploration missions has seen both accomplishments and financial considerations. In 2008, the pioneering Chandrayaan-1 mission was undertaken at a cost of $48 million. This endeavour marked a significant step forward in India’s space capabilities. A decade later, in 2019, the more ambitious Chandrayaan-2 mission followed, with a budget of $141 million. This mission aimed to further explore the lunar surface and conduct advanced experiments.

Continuing this trajectory of lunar exploration, the year 2023 witnessed the Chandrayaan-3 mission, which was executed at a cost of $74 million. These endeavours collectively amount to a substantial investment of $263 million in India’s lunar exploration initiatives, reflecting the country’s commitment to advancing scientific knowledge beyond our planet.

In a comparison that highlights the financial scope of such endeavours, it’s worth noting that Sri Lanka’s ventures into space and infrastructure have come with their own price tags. The launch of SupremeSAT-1 in 2012, during the Rajapaksa regime, incurred a considerable cost of $320 million. While contributing to the nation’s technological aspirations, this investment also prompted discussions on resource allocation.

Similarly, the construction of the Mattala Airport in 2013, also under the Rajapaksa regime, incurred a substantial expenditure of $209 million. However, despite its potential to bolster connectivity and regional growth, the airport remains underutilized.

Together, these ventures, often referred to as ‘white elephant projects’, have collectively contributed to an expenditure of a staggering $529 million. This figure prompts reflection on the allocation of resources and the long-term implications of such investments on Sri Lanka’s technological and infrastructural landscape.

When embarking on the task of crafting the Chandrayaan-3 lunar mission, scientists from the Indian space agency understood that they were presented with a final opportunity to etch their mark in history by achieving a successful landing on the lunar south pole. This aspiration followed a previous attempt that had fallen short four years prior. Compounded by the necessity to operate within stringent budget constraints, the mission was ultimately accomplished with a modest expenditure of 6.15 billion rupees, equivalent to approximately $75 million.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) showcased its adeptness in achieving more with limited resources through its triumph in executing the Chandrayaan-3 moon landing. This accomplishment emerged from a combination of strategies, ranging from judicious management of rocket expenses to the establishment of a domestic supply infrastructure. The collective consensus among officials, suppliers and analysts underscores how ISRO has refined a methodology of achieving remarkable feats while keeping expenditures in check.

ISRO’s exceptional aptitude for resourceful innovation faces upcoming trials, including an imminent sun study project slated for launch next month and a grander scheme of sending astronauts into orbit.

S. Somanath, ISRO’s Chairman and a seasoned aerospace engineer, proudly asserted, “No one in the world can do it like we do.” He refrained from divulging all the intricacies that contribute to this feat, for fear of diluting ISRO’s unique cost-effectiveness.

One example of ISRO’s cost-containment approach is evident in the trajectory selected for Chandrayaan-3. Opting for a longer lunar route enabled the utilization of less potent and more economical propulsion systems. This elongated route, spanning over 40 days, capitalized on the gravitational pull of Earth to serve as a slingshot, propelling the spacecraft toward the moon. In contrast, Russia’s Luna-25 mission, which experienced a mishap in its attempt to land on the lunar south pole, pursued a more direct course. However, this route necessitated greater power, fuel, and financial resources.

ISRO’s adeptness extended to the in-house development of essential lander components, including cameras, altimeters, and hazard avoidance sensors. Furthermore, the organization tapped into Indian suppliers for vehicle assembly, transportation and electronics to curtail costs. The strategic limitation of design prototypes further streamlined the mission’s timeline and financial investment.

Amit Sharma, CEO of Tata Consulting Engineers, a vendor for ISRO’s Chandrayaan-3 project, affirmed, “With local sourcing of equipment and design elements, we are able to reduce the price considerably. A similar setup by an international vendor would cost four to five times more.” The culmination of these strategies highlights ISRO’s prowess in achieving monumental feats while embracing resourcefulness as a cornerstone of its approach.

Numerous ISRO scientists who were integral to the prior, unsuccessful Chandrayaan-2 mission to land on the lunar south pole in 2019 have remained dedicated to the current undertaking. ISRO is in the process of readying the Aditya-L1 spacecraft, a solar observatory stationed in space, for launch in September. Additionally, the organization has ambitious plans to launch a manned space mission as early as 2025, as indicated by ISRO’s Chairman, Somanath.

ISRO’s triumphs hold the potential to catalyze growth for the nation’s private-sector space start-ups. This development comes at a time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration is exploring the opening of the sector to foreign investments—a move that suppliers suggest could be bolstered by ISRO’s successes.

Ankit Patel, the Founder and Director of Ankit Fasteners, a supplier to ISRO since 1994, divulged the lesser-known aspects of ISRO’s achievements. There were instances where components had to be personally transported to launchpads to meet stringent deadlines. Patel acknowledged the unheralded engineers behind ISRO, who relentlessly push suppliers to adhere to established timelines. He noted, “ISRO has been very frugal with its expenditure. ISRO needs to think out of the box to stretch every rupee.”

Meanwhile, in the realm of financial comparisons, Opposition Leader Sajith Premadasa highlighted the disparity between India’s Chandrayaan-3 mission expenditure, estimated at USD 263 million, and Sri Lanka’s USD 320 million investment in launching SupremeSAT in 2012. He emphasized the successful culmination of India’s Chandrayaan series, spanning three attempts over the years, as opposed to Sri Lanka’s satellite venture.

Premadasa’s call for accountability urged the government to present a report to Parliament detailing the substantial outlay on SupremeSAT and its outcomes. He underscored how, instead of reaching the lunar surface, the project has symbolized a downturn for Sri Lanka.

In a different context, back in 2017, former Megapolis and Western Development Minister Patali Champika Ranawaka alleged that the previous government misappropriated Rs. 460 million from the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) funds for the SupremeSAT project. He suggested that the funds were diverted under the pretense of coal imports, a claim that sparked investigations.

The narrative shifted to the launch of Supreme Sat I in 2012 from China’s Xichang Space Center. This joint venture between Sri Lanka and China’s SupremeSAT and China Great Wall Industry Corporation marked Sri Lanka’s entry into satellite launching. Despite the $320 million investment, the satellite struggled to fulfill its intended role.

Meanwhile, the Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport serves as a potent example of a project that has fallen short of its intended objectives. The ambitious plan to establish an international gateway with the aim of boosting tourism and economic growth faced a host of challenges. Remote location, limited passenger traffic and operational issues transformed the airport into a “white elephant.”

In the Sri Lankan context, the accusations of connivance between Chinese entities and corrupt politicians raise concerns about the misuse of public funds and the potential for projects to be driven by political motivations rather than genuine developmental goals. The allegations surrounding the SupremeSAT satellite project and the diversion of funds for the Mattala Airport suggest a scenario where external actors might have taken advantage of loopholes in governance systems. The $320 million expenditure on the SupremeSAT project and the staggering $209 million spent on the Mattala Airport, despite its underutilization, highlight the detrimental impact of inadequate feasibility studies and an inability to adapt to changing circumstances.

On the other hand, India’s approach, exemplified by ISRO’s strict spending policies and strategic resource management, has showcased the potential for remarkable achievements within constrained budgets. ISRO’s emphasis on frugal innovation has allowed the organization to achieve remarkable milestones in space exploration while keeping costs comparatively low. The Chandrayaan series, which saw successful lunar missions while spending a total of $263 million for three attempts, highlights how disciplined planning, cost-effective solutions, and efficient utilization of resources can lead to significant accomplishments.

the comparison between Sri Lanka’s financial wastage and India’s prudent spending policies takes on additional significance when considering external factors like alleged connivance with corrupt politicians. These factors highlight the importance of transparent governance, ethical decision-making, and accountability in ensuring that projects funded by public resources contribute meaningfully to national development. The lessons learned from both Sri Lanka’s challenges and India’s successes underscore the need for responsible management of public funds and the pursuit of projects that truly benefit society.