The Steps To Achieve Justice In Sri Lanka
Pitasanna Shanmugathas
Under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tenure, the Sri Lankan civil war, which spanned from 1983 to 2009, reached its brutal conclusion on May 18, 2009. This marked the end of a 25-year conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a separatist rebel group. The conflict stemmed from longstanding grievances, including discriminatory policies against the Tamil minority, perpetrated by successive governments dominated by the Sinhala-Buddhist community. The LTTE sought to establish a separate state in the North and East of Sri Lanka, leading to a protracted and violent struggle. During the final stages of the war, an estimated 40,000 Tamil civilians were killed, predominantly in the rebel-hold north of the country (Lynch, 2011). The Sri Lankan military achieved a decisive victory, decimating the entire military leadership of the LTTE, including its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Throughout the conflict, both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE were implicated in severe human rights abuses. The government engaged in extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, and indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas (Lynch, 2011). Sri Lanka has the second-largest number of enforced disappearances globally, as reported by Amnesty International (Ravindran, 2022). On the other hand, the LTTE employed tactics such as suicide bombings, targeted killings of politicians, decimating rival Tamil factions, forced recruitment of child soldiers, and using civilians as human shields (Hoole, 2009, p. 123) (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The LTTE also perpetrated ethnic cleansing and atrocities against the minority Muslim community (Srinivasan, 2020). Despite the end of the civil war, the Rajapaksa government continued its oppressive policies towards the Tamil community, including enforced disappearances, torture, increasing militarization, and land confiscation in Tamil-dominated regions (Human Rights Watch , 2018) (Ganguly, 2021).
In response to international pressure for accountability and reconciliation, President Rajapaksa launched the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) in May 2010 (Amnesty International, 2011). The commission aimed to investigate the breakdown of the ceasefire in 2002 through to final stages of the war in 2009, with a focus on uncovering atrocities and identifying perpetrators. However, the LLRC faced criticism for its limited mandate, lack of independence, and failure to meet international standards (Sri Lanka 2015 Human Rights Report, 2015). Many groups refused to participate in its proceedings, and the report was seen as biased, largely absolving the Sri Lankan military of accountability. President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s administration has proposed a new Truth and Reconciliation Commission, with a bill gazette in Parliament on January 1st, 2024 (Perera, 2024). However, this initiative has been met with skepticism, particularly by Tamil politicians and Human Rights Watch, who doubt its credibility and adequacy in providing victim support, given the shortcomings of previous reconciliation efforts (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
Fernando Travesi, the Executive Director of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, asserted that the persistent goals of transitional justice are the acknowledgment and redress of violations, the recognition of individuals’ dignity, and a shared goal to prevent the recurrence of such violations (Fernando, 2018). The additional goals may include establishing accountable institutions, ensuring justice accessibility for the vulnerable, promoting effective involvement of women and marginalized groups, upholding the rule of law, facilitating peace processes, addressing root causes of conflict, and advocating reconciliation efforts (Fernando, 2018).
This essay argues that genuine transitional justice in Sri Lanka requires the Wickremesinghe government’s commitment to comprehensive truth-seeking, involving all stakeholders directly and indirectly affected by the conflict. Furthermore, there must be an acknowledgment and redress of human rights violations, many of which were documented in past failed truth commissions, as well as acknowledgment of the harm caused by colonial legacies, and a firm blueprint towards political, economic, and constitutional reform that will redress the grievances of the pluralistic communities on the island, including providing reparations for victims of atrocities.
Step 1: Incorporate the Reforms of Past Commissions
Over recent decades, Sri Lankan governments have established but failed to implement the recommendations of numerous commissions to address human rights violations stemming from the civil war of 1983 to 2009 and the communist-led insurrection of 1988-1990. These commissions, numbering at least ten since the 1990s, had been tasked with examining various incidents of alleged rights abuses, such as the Udalagama Commission, established in 2006 to investigate serious human rights violations, the Lessons Learned Reconciliation Commission, formed in 2010 to promote truth and reconciliation, the Paranagama Commission, focused on the fate of missing persons, the Consultation Taks Force for Reconciliation Mechanisms, which conducted public consultations on transitional justice, and most recently, the Nawaz Commission established in 2021 as an alternative to international accountability efforts (Sri Lanka 2015 Human Rights Report, 2015). Despite receiving testimony of human rights abuses from victims’ families and witnesses, these commissions have often been criticized for their failure to translate findings into meaningful action, leading to disillusionment and frustration among those seeking justice.
Moreover, a notable deficiency of these commissions lies in the fact that the Sri Lankan government selects politicians and academics to serve on the commission (Sri Lanka 2015 Human Rights Report, 2015). This approach adopts a top-down method for implementing reforms deemed beneficial for the nation, without sufficiently involving stakeholders directly and indirectly impacted by the conflict (Gready & Robins, 2014). Because of this approach, the conclusions of the commission do not reveal the gravity of the government’s atrocities. For instance, the Udalagama Commission acknowledged the Sri Lankan army’s shelling during the final stages of the war caused a lot of death but the Commission projected blame exclusively on the LTTE, asserting, “this was an inevitable consequence of the LTTE’s refusal to permit civilians to leave their control in order to use them both as a shield and a pool for recruitment” (Sri Lanka 2015 Human Rights Report, 2015).
In addition to the lack of impartiality for truth and accountability, the Sri Lankan-government spearheaded commissions fail to provide adequate avenues for these stakeholders indirectly and directly affected by the nation’s conflicts to contribute their perspectives on the most effective solutions to address their grievances. Since February 20th, 2017, the mothers of Sri Lankan Tamils who were forcibly disappeared during the 25-year civil war have engaged in daily protests, walking the streets in the North holding up photos of their lost loved ones, asking the Sri Lankan government to provide them with answers as to their fate (Jeyaraj, 2022). Instead of engaging with these mothers, Wickremesinghe, when he was Prime Minister, nonchalantly said in a 2016 interview with British Channel 4 News that any people still missing after the war are “most probably dead” without providing any answers as to how they died (Wickremesinghe, 2016). A meaningful truth and reconciliation commission would seek to have a representative of these mothers within the composition structure of the transitional justice system. As asserted by research fellows Paul Gready and Simon Robins, “transformative justice is not the top-down imposition of external legal frameworks or institutional templates, but a more bottom-up understanding and analysis of the lives and needs of populations” (Gready & Robins, 2014, p. 340).
Nevertheless, the overarching broad recommendations by some of the previous commissions might prove to be valuable if incorporated in a future truth and reconciliation commission that does seek to engage in transitional justice utilizing a bottom-up engagement. For instance, in its report, the Rajapaksa-designated Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) made a broad range of recommendations towards addressing human rights in post-conflict Sri Lanka (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011). Key recommendations include ensuring equal land rights, urgent attention was demanded for women, children, the elderly, and people with disabilities, including economic assistance, education, healthcare, and psychosocial support (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011). The Commission stressed that resettlement efforts for internally displaced persons (IDPs) must continue, with specific focus on Muslim IDPs from the North. The Commission asserted that upholding media freedom and investigating attacks on journalists is essential. Additionally, the commission called for thorough investigations into human rights violations, prosecution of perpetrators, disarmament of illegal armed groups, and rehabilitation of former child combatants (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011). Family reunification and employment opportunities were highlighted for affected communities, emphasizing the importance of closure for families of missing persons in fostering reconciliation (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011). While the LLRC’s recommendations were sensible, and were applauded by foreign governments like Canada, Australia, the United States, the LLRC’s reports of what were the established facts during the final stages of the civil war were strongly condemned. For instance, the report asserts that during the final stages of the war, the Sri Lankan government gave the “highest priority” in terms of protecting civilians—however this assertion is categorically rejected by numerous human rights groups and the civilians on the ground (Sri Lanka 2015 Human Rights Report, 2015).
For a truth and reconciliation commission to be effective, the facts must be representative what transitional justice expert Anita Isaacs refers to as “a collective voice,” rather than a singular narrative—predominantly the government’s—that claims its version of history during the final stages of the war is incontrovertible (Isaacs , 2010, p. 261). Isaacs looked at truth-seeking in post-war Guatemala and concluded that their effort to engage in truth initiatives were indicative of “how politics can interfere with a truth commission’s effort to produce a consensus history, end violence, or afford reconciliation” (Isaacs , 2010, p. 251). Similarly, the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, comprising the ruling government class, has a history of catering to ethno-nationalist politics (DeVotta, 2021). It was not in the interests of Rajapaksa or his party to acknowledge that the Sri Lankan army indiscriminately bombed civilians during the final stages of the war. It was more politically suitable to shift the blame exclusively on the LTTE. Due to the unwillingness of the Sinhala-Buddhist dominated governments to legitimately pursue accountability, Sri Lankan Tamils have expressed a demand for an independent investigation either by the United Nations or another credible external party into allegations of human rights abuses and war crimes (Joseph, 2012). However, due to the Sri Lankan government’s desire to limit any form of accountability, that demand has been rebuffed and numerous United Nations resolutions calling for accountability into credible allegations of war crimes have been ignored by successive Sri Lankan governments since the end of the war in 2009 (Human Rights Watch, 2023). As a result, the collective voice is what all previous truth commissions in Sri Lanka lacked and that is what Sri Lankans fear the planned Wickremesinghe-led truth and reconciliation commission will lack (Human Rights Watch, 2023).
Despite the lack of credibility as to the retelling of events during the last stages of the war, the LLRC’s recommendations were viewed as valuable. However, the Rajapaksa government refused to implement them, and thus the commission failed. Nevertheless, such recommendations by the LLRC, if implemented within an effective truth and reconciliation process, would be fundamental towards achieving effective transitional justice. However, to implement any recommendations within an effective truth and reconciliation process there must be a commitment towards a fundamental restructuring of the political-constitutional system within Sri Lanka which was designed to empower the majoritarian community and stifle the views of the minority.
Step 2: Make A Commitment to Reform Sri Lanka’s Majoritarian Political System
For meaningful transitional justice to take place in Sri Lanka, it requires a fundamental reformation of its institutions. University of Notre Dame political scientist Daniel Philpott emphasizes that “building socially just institutions is the practice that most converges with liberal peace” (Philpott, 2006, p. 343). In the case of Sri Lanka, achieving liberal peace demands significant changes in the existing political structures, which are inherently majoritarian and aimed at suppressing minority rights while bolstering the dominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority.
The current political system in Sri Lanka operates as a unitary state with an executive presidential system, enabling successive Presidents since its inception in 1978 to enact oppressive laws and stifle democratic opposition. To pave the way for meaningful transitional justice, it is imperative to reform this unitary state (Welikala , 2016). In consultation with the various communities in the nation, such reformation should involve substantial devolution of power, granting autonomy to minority communities at the regional level, and ensuring their representation at the federal level. Additionally, safeguards must be established to prevent the central government from unilaterally removing powers delegated to the regions, as is currently the case.
A crucial aspect of effective transitional justice is unraveling the historical roots of present political oppression. Priscilla Hayner, co-founder of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, underscores the significance of truth commissions in uncovering an authentic narrative of a nation’s past and dispelling the veil of silence and denial surrounding tumultuous historical periods (Hayner, 2011, p. 25). This principle was starkly exemplified during the visit of the Pope to Canada in 2022, where he issued an apology to indigenous survivors of residential schools (Winfield & Smith, 2022). However, the apology’s limited scope, focusing solely on isolated wrongdoings of individual members within the Church, without addressing the Church’s fallibility as an institution, such as the Church’s complicity in colonial atrocities stemming from fifteenth-century papal decrees supporting Spain and Portugal to engage in the colonization and oppression of indigenous peoples, raised questions about the integrity of truth and reconciliation efforts (Winfield & Smith, 2022). Similarly, neglecting to confront the root causes of Sri Lanka’s oppressive political system would undermine the effectiveness of its transitional justice endeavors.
The majoritarian political system in Sri Lanka traces its origins back to British colonial policies. The enactment of the Sinhala Only Act in 1956, which made Sinhala the sole official language of the country and consequently led to the expulsion of Tamils from key jobs within the government sector and high sectors of society, stemmed directly from British colonial linguistic discrimination (Daily FT, 2018). Despite the repeal of the Sinhala Only Act in 1987 with the advent of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution making Tamil and Sinhala the two official languages of the country, the enduring legacy of the Sinhala Only Act continues to inflict economic and societal harm on Sri Lankans.
In 2018 interview, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on terrorism in Sri Lanka, talked about the lingering legacy of the Sinhala Only Act. Gunaratna asserted that:
“By introducing the Sinhala Only Act, Sri Lanka had achieved nothing, and the legislation had only destroyed the country’s security and stability and precipitated a 30-year civil war…. It has also destroyed the country’s education system. Today, none of our universities are ranked universities. If we had stuck to English education, all our children would have studied in English and there would have been no need to translate the higher education books into Sinhala language. Since the translating of academic books is a tedious process, a very limited number of books can be translated a year. Knowledge is vast and we could translate only a few books into Sinhala. Therefore, we are producing substandard academics and professionals because of the Sinhala Only Act” (Daily FT, 2018).
Reparations for the survivors and descendants impacted by the Sinhala Only Act must be prioritized. Reparations, as defined by Philpott, “are a material payment to victims of political injustices…..they may take the form of money, mental and physical health services, and the like” (Philpott, 2006, p. 345). Constructing universities in Tamil-dominated regions and implementing tailored educational programs to uplift the Tamil community could serve as viable forms of reparations, informed by consultations with affected communities.
The unitary state concept, inherited from British colonial rule, has exacerbated tensions in Sri Lanka. The two main political parties which dominated Sri Lanka’s political landscape in the post-independence era were the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP). Both parties would utilize the unitary political system of governance to engage in policies of ethnic outbidding to determine which party could strip the Tamil minority greater rights to win the votes of the Sinhala-Buddhist fundamental hardliners. The outcome of the ethnic outbidding resulted in the Sinhala Only Act and the Standardization Act (1971); the latter imposed higher test score requirements for Tamils than their Sinhala counterparts if they wanted to enter Sri Lankan universities. Subsequent constitutions, including the 1972 Republican constitution and the 1978 constitution, reinforced this unitary structure (Edrisinha, 2020, p. 933).
The explicit declaration of Sri Lanka as a unitary state served several purposes. Firstly, it symbolically reinforced the dominance of the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, which saw itself as the rightful owner of the state. Secondly, it rejected the demands of Tamil nationalists for federal autonomy, framing such demands as threats to the integrity of the unitary state. In 1978, Sinhala nationalist hardliner UNP President JR Jayewardene established the Executive Presidential system within the 1978 Constitution, which replaced the previous parliamentary system with a presidential one (Edrisinha, 2020, p. 935). The Executive Presidential system aimed to centralize power in the hands of the President. The Executive President enjoys the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, dissolve parliament, declare a state of emergency, and the appointment of judgments (Edrisinha, 2020, p. 936). In the aftermath of establishing the Executive Presidency, JR Jayewardene established draconian legislation such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) in 1979 which is a draconic law that allows the Sri Lankan government to arbitrarily detain any civilian suspected of being a threat to the nation’s national security without any due process (Amnesty International, 2022). The law, still in existence today, has been used against Tamil civilians suspected of terrorist activities as well as journalists publishing critical information about the Sri Lankan government (Amnesty International, 2022). The outcome of a meaningful transitional justice system must result in the dismantling of this draconian measure and the abolition of the Executive Presidency.
Efforts to reform Sri Lanka’s unitary structure during the civil war faced significant challenges, which must be acknowledged during a legitimate truth and reconciliation process. As asserted by Philpott, the wounds inflicted by political injustices are “compounded when the surrounding community fails to recognize the victim’s suffering” (Philpott, 2006, p. 344). Philpott continues to say that the lack of acknowledgement serves not only as a primary wound but also a source of victims’ hostility toward fledgling political orders, thus perpetuating a cycle of secondary wounds (Philpott, 2006, p. 344). During the civil war, efforts were made by President Chandrika Kumaratunga who rose to power in 1994 on a progressive platform of ending the civil war by introducing constitutional reforms designed to redress the grievances of the minority community (Shanmugathas, 2019). The LTTE, in addition to the political rivalry between the two dominant Sinhala nationalist political parties, sought to sabotage any meaningful effort to reform Sri Lanka’s unitary structure and introduce constitutional reform to peacefully end the civil war (Shanmugathas, 2019). A key drafter of the proposals was Harvard-educated Tamil constitutional lawyer and politician Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam (Shanmugathas, 2019). During its history, the LTTE assassinated Dr. Tiruchelvam and other Tamil dissidents who were opposed to a separate state and called for a federal solution to the ethnic conflict. A credible truth and reconciliation commission must acknowledge the atrocities of the LTTE in this regard and former members of the LTTE must come forward to acknowledge such responsibility.
A credible truth and reconciliation commission must also look towards attempts to reform Sri Lanka’s unitary state and seek to implement portions of past proposals into a new living constitutional document for the country. In 1995, the Kumaratunga government released the Union of Regions proposals aimed to reform the unitary state by fundamentally reshaping governance by devolving substantial power to autonomous regions (Shanmugathas, 2019). These proposals sought to redefine Sri Lanka as a union of regions, granting full executive and legislative authority. Specifically, the proposals advocated for the weakening of the unitary provision of Sri Lanka’s constitution by abrogating Article 76 of the Constitution and removing the concurrent list. The proposals introduced safeguards to prevent unilateral withdrawal of powers delegated to regions, including provisions for Chief Minister tenure and the establishment of a permanent commission on devolution (Shanmugathas, 2019). One historical grievance of Tamil politicians always has been the fact that the Sinhalese politicians would always renege on their promises of granting political powers to the Tamil regions. The provisions within the Union of Regions proposals ensured that regions had exclusive legislative powers within their jurisdiction. Additionally, the proposals included provisions to empower regions in matters of finance, borrowing, and setting up financial institutions, thereby granting them greater fiscal autonomy. Sri Lankan Tamil academic Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu hailed the proposals at the time of their release as “federalism in all but name” (Shanmugathas, 2019). In the context of Sri Lanka’s reform efforts, the failure of certain factions, including the LTTE and the UNP, to acknowledge the legitimacy of proposed reforms deepens societal divisions and impedes the establishment of a just and inclusive political framework. A new constitutional blueprint for Sri Lanka must be devised during the transitional justice process with the participation of all stakeholders indirectly and directly affected by the conflict and should consider past proposals, such as the Union of Regions proposals.
Step 3: Political Reform Must Be Accompanied by Economic Reform for Durable Peace
Nevik Aiken, a researcher of transitional justice, explored the shortcomings of the truth and reconciliation process in the aftermath of apartheid in South Africa and concluded that “reconciliation [would] be impossible without economic redistribution, without any material changes in people’s lives” (Aiken, 2016, p. 194). Aiken’s views about the failed process of transitional justice in South Africa echoes the views of famed author and dissident Arundhati Roy who wrote in her book, Capitalism: A Ghost Story:
“When Nelson Mandela took over as South Africa’s first Black President, he was canonized as a living saint, not just because he was a freedom fighter who spent 27 years in prison, but also because he deferred completely to the Washington Consensus. Socialism disappeared from the ANC’s agenda. South Africa’s great ‘peaceful transition’, so praised and lauded, meant no land reforms, no demands for reparation, no nationalization of South Africa’s mines. Instead, there was Privatisation and Structural Adjustment” (Roy, 2014).
Similarly, in the case of Sri Lanka, the introduction of harsh neoliberal policies in the 1970s by JR Jayewardene has led to massive economic disparities, including the free fall of Sri Lanka’s economy in 2022 which led to the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the brother of former President Mahinda Rajapaksa (Kuruvilla, 2022). Meaningful transitional justice in Sri Lanka must not only include political reforms but must be accompanied by serious economic reforms dedicated to dismantling the neoliberal system that dominates the society.
The discourse on transitional justice, particularly in the aftermath of apartheid in South Africa and the civil war in Sri Lanka, underscores the inherent interrelationship between the alleviation of material inequalities, interracial reconciliation, and national unity. Nevik Aiken’s exploration of the truth and reconciliation process in South Africa resonated with this perspective, as emphasized by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report which Aiken has cited to in his scholarly work. The report noted that “[g]ross socio-economic inequalities are the visible legacy of the systematic, institutionalized denial of access to resources and development opportunities on grounds of colour, race and sex” (Aiken, 2016, p. 194). The TRC emphasized that the road to reconciliation entails both material reconstruction and the restoration of dignity, requiring wide-ranging structural and institutional transformation, as well as the healing of broken human relationships.
However, as former TRC Commissioner Yasmin Sooka contends, the South African Commission faced a fundamental problem in attempting to separate individual rights violations from the broader structural dynamics in which they occurred (Aiken, 2016, p. 194). Sooka notes that by focusing solely on individual crimes, the TRC failed to address the unjust structural systems that perpetuated inequality and injustice. In 2016, economist Anna Orthofer, examining the nation’s tax and survey data, asserted that persistent economic disparities exist in post-apartheid South Africa, where 10 percent of the population, mostly white, owns over 90 percent of national wealth, while 80 percent, most black, owns nothing (Orthofer , 2016, p. 3). Neoliberal economic policies have exacerbated inequalities, leaving many black South Africans without access to basic services and opportunities. This limitation highlights the importance of recognizing and addressing the broader structural issues that underpin human rights violations and social injustices (Aiken, 2016, p. 194).
In Sri Lanka, the transition towards neoliberalism since the late 1970s, spearheaded by JR Jayewardene’s government, marked a stark departure from the country’s previous socio-economic framework (Herring , 1987, p. 325). Prior to neoliberal frameworks, Sri Lanka had a history of significant state intervention and investment in social welfare programs. From the 1940s to the mid-1970s, governments implemented popular schemes such as the rice ration program, free education, and healthcare, which enjoyed widespread support and contributed to social cohesion. Due to these welfare initiatives, political scientist Ronald Herring highlighted that in the mid-1970s, Sri Lanka boasted a life expectancy comparable to some European nations and significantly higher than any of its neighboring countries in the subcontinent (Herring , 1987, p. 326). However, Jayewardene’s administration embraced neoliberal policies, including privatization, deregulation, and trade liberalization, under the guise of modernization and economic growth. The establishment of export processing zones in 1978 exemplified this shift, as it attracted foreign investment but also led to the exploitation of cheap labor and the erosion of worker rights (Herring , 1987, p. 328). JR Jayewardene also used the powers of his executive presidency to criminalize union protests and implement policies to erode labor rights (Herring , 1987, p. 328).
Moreover, the dismantling of the rice ration program and other social welfare initiatives symbolized the prioritization of market forces over social protection, resulting in increased poverty and inequality (Skanthakumar, 2014). Successive governments, regardless of political affiliation, continued to pursue neoliberal policies, further exacerbating socio-economic disparities, and neglecting the welfare of ordinary citizens. Chandrika Kumaratunga’s presidency witnessed accelerated privatization and deepening neoliberal reforms, despite promises to champion the working class (Skanthakumar, 2014). The Mahinda Rajapaksa administration’s tenure saw ambitious infrastructure projects funded by commercial loans, which ultimately failed to generate expected revenues and exacerbated the country’s debt burden (Salikuddin, 2022). Additionally, neoliberal tax cuts implemented by the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government led to a decline in tax revenue, further straining public finances (Salikuddin, 2022).
The continuation of neoliberal agendas under President Ranil Wickremesinghe reflects a persistent prioritization of elite interests over the majority’s demands. Wickremesinghe’s government has advocated for further privatization and deregulation, sacrificing public services such as healthcare and education at the altar of neoliberal orthodox (Kuruvilla, 2022).
According to data from the Central Bank of Colombo in 2012, the wealthiest 20 percent of households in Sri Lanka command 54.1 percent of the total income share, while the poorest 20 percent hold a mere 4.5 percent (Central Bank of Sri Lanka , 2012). Additionally, the combined income of the middle 60 percent falls below that of the richest 20 percent. As income inequality persists and wealth concentrates among the affluent, government investment in programs for the working class has dwindled (Central Bank of Sri Lanka , 2012). World Bank statistics from 2011 reveal that Sri Lanka’s expenditure on education lags behind that of other South Asian nations, marking a significant departure from previous decades (World Bank, 2011).
Sri Lanka’s descent into a neoliberal failed state, marked by systemic issues like tax exemptions for the wealthy and the erosion of public services, underscores the urgent need for structural reforms prioritizing social justice and equitable development to break the cycle of crisis and instability. Without meaningful changes that address the root causes of economic disparity and social injustice, Sri Lanka risks perpetuating a vicious cycle of neoliberal exploitation and socio-economic instability.
As argued by Aiken apartheid South Africa was not merely a system of racial discrimination but a complex web of structural inequalities that perpetuated socioeconomic disparities along racial lines (Aiken, 2016). These entrenched inequalities not only fueled the conflict but also posed significant barriers to achieving genuine reconciliation post-apartheid. Similarly, Sri Lanka grapples with its own history of ethnic conflict, and without addressing the underlying socioeconomic disparities, efforts toward reconciliation are likely to be superficial and unsustainable.
A meaningful pathway towards transitional justice in Sri Lanka must envision a radical redistribution of wealth to the most impoverished and vulnerable communities, such as those affected by the ethnic conflict. It must result in the strengthening of welfare programs and social safety nets, while ensuring stringent tax laws are imposed targeting the wealthy in the country.
In Conclusion: How To Move On, How to Deal with Perpetrators?
A viable transitional justice process must require the implementation of the recommendation of past truth and reconciliation commissions in Sri Lanka as well as the reformation of Sri Lanka’s political and economic system. While implementing such reforms with the consultation and participation of stakeholders directly and indirectly affected by the conflict would address many of the underlying grievances created by the ethnic conflict, there remains significant debate within the Sri Lankan community regarding how to deal with perpetrators of abuses.
There have been massive demands within the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora community for the referral to the International Criminal Court of Sri Lankan politicians and Sri Lankan soldiers who committed atrocities during the final stage of the war (Rasingam, 2022). However, this policy does not have support among the majority Sinhalese people in the country and therefore lacks strong likelihood of being incorporated into a transitional justice process that could garner cooperation and involvement among all stakeholders within the country.
Since the end of the civil war in 2009, numerous United Nations resolutions have passed calling for accountability and transparency into war crimes allegations in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government has largely refused to comply with the United Nations in investigating human right abuses. In 2021, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted resolution 46/1 on Sri Lanka to establish an accountability process to gather evidence of international crimes. The resolution addresses past failures in providing justice for atrocities by establishing a dedicated process to collect evidence of international crimes committed in Sri Lanka (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2021). However, the Gotabaya Rajapaksa government rejected the UN resolution and refused to cooperate.
Louise Mallinder, a professor at the Transitional Justice Institute, argues that the duty to prosecute involves navigating complex trade-offs in political negotiations to achieve inclusive political settlements and contribute positively to sustainable peace (Mallinder , 2022, p. 76). The primary demand within the United Nations and the Sri Lankan Tamil community is for an independent investigation into allegations of war crimes (Rasingam, 2022). In Sri Lanka, there is one potential trade-off that communities affected by the conflict can negotiate with the Sri Lankan politicians in power to ensure an effective transitional justice process. This involves guaranteeing that, in exchange for their cooperation in a full and transparent independent investigation into human rights abuses during the ethnic conflict, perpetrators implicated in the atrocities will not face criminal prosecution if they choose to participate in testifying alongside the victims, thereby shedding light on the nature of the accusation against them. Given that both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government have been accused of heinous atrocities, such a trade-off would be the best option for both Tamils and Sinhalese concerned if they wish to succeed in establishing a durable transitional justice process.
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